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Little is known about the reactions of tort litigants to traditional
and alternative litigation procedures. To explore this issue, we inter-
viewed litigants in personal injury cases in three state courts whose
cases had been resolved by trial, court-annexed arbitration, judicial
settlement conferences, or bilateral settlement. The litigants viewed
the trial and arbitration procedures as fairer than bilateral settle-
ment, apparently because they believed that trials and arbitration
hearings gave their case more respectful treatment. They were less
satisfied with the outcome of judicial settlement conferences than
with the outcome of bilateral settlements, because judicial settlement
conference outcomes were more likely to fall below their expecta-
tions. In general, procedural justice judgments and outcome satisfac-
tion were little related to objective outcome, cost, or delay; instead
the evaluations appeared to be determined largely by perceptions of
whether the procedure met litigants' criteria for procedural fairness
and expectations on outcomes and costs. Gender, income, and race did
not have much effect on evaluations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sociolegal researchers have studied disputants' reactions to a
variety of legal procedures: small-claims mediation and adjudica-
tion (McEwen and Maiman, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986; O'Barr and Con-
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ley, 1985, 1988; Sarat, 1976; Vidmar, 1984, 1985, 1986); plea bargain-
ing and criminal trial procedures (Casper, 1978; Casper et al., 1988;
Heinz and Kerstetter, 1979; Houlden, 1981; Landis and Goodstein,
1986; Tyler, 1984; Tyler et al., 1989); as well as less formal en-
counters with police and other legal authorities (Tyler, 1988, 1990).
In family law, studies have compared disputants' reactions to bilat-
eral settlement, mediation, and adjudication (Erlanger et al., 1987;
Pearson and Thoennes, 1984, 1985). However, few studies have ex-
amined how disputants involved in tort litigation react to trial pro-
cedures and to the various alternative procedures that civil courts
now use to dispose of tort cases (some exceptions are Lind, 1990,
and MacCoun et al., 1988). The study described here examined the
attitudes and impressions of litigants in personal injury tort cases
in three state courts.
In this study we considered two general questions of impor-
tance to our understanding of how litigants interpret their exper-
iences with the legal system. First, we investigated whether out-
come-related factors (such as the amount of the settlement or
verdict, the cost of the litigation, and the time taken to resolve the
case) have greater impact on litigants' evaluations of litigation ex-
periences than do process-related factors (e.g., the litigant's percep-
tion that the procedure gives them control, allows participation, or
treats them with respect) or litigant characteristics (e.g., litigants'
race or gender). And second, we tested whether, as is often sup-
posed, bilateral settlement is viewed more favorably than are
third-party procedures. To answer these questions we interviewed
tort litigants whose cases had been resolved by trial, court-an-
nexed arbitration (a procedure in which a lawyer-arbitrator hears
the case and offers a nonbinding judgment for liability and dam-
ages), settlement conference (a procedure in which a judge at-
tempts to assist the attorneys in settling the case), and bilateral
settlement. We collected data on case outcomes, litigation costs,
time to case termination, and litigants' personal characteristics,
and we asked the litigants about their impressions of the litigation
process, the case outcome, and the cost and delay involved in
resolving the case.
Our study focused on two dimensions of the litigants' evalua-
tions of their experiences with the court: their judgments of the
fairness of procedures and their satisfaction with the outcome of
their case. Disputants' reactions to various dispute processing pro-
cedures have long been a topic of concern in the study of law and
society (e.g., Abel, 1974; Felstiner, 1974; Gluckman, 1969; Gulliver,
1979; Nader, 1969; Nader and Todd, 1978), but until the mid-1970s,
disputants' evaluations were thought of in general, undifferenti-
ated terms. Over the past decade and a half, however, researchers
have begun to distinguish between disputants' satisfaction with
outcomes and their judgments of the fairness of pro~edures. The
distinction between judgments of procedural fairness and satisfac-
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tion with outcomes arose in large part from the work of Thibaut
and Walker (1975, 1978), which showed in laboratory settings that
a procedure can be judged fair even when it yields unsatisfactory
outcomes. Recent field research (e.g., Casper et al., 1988; Landis
and Goodstein, 1986; MacCoun et al., 1988) has supported this dis-
tinction by demonstrating that while outcome satisfaction and pro-
cedural fairness judgments are generally correlated, the two
dimensions can be distinguished empirically in the evaluations of
criminal defendants and tort litigants.
II. CASE OUTCOMES, PROCESS CONCERNS, AND LITIGANT
EVALUATIONS OF LITIGATION EXPERIENCES
A. Objective Outcomes, Costs, and Delay in Litigation
It is widely assumed that the outcome of a case-the amount
won or lost-is one of the most important, if not the most impor-
tant, factor affecting litigants' satisfaction and perceptions of jus-
tice. The assumption is so pervasive that it is seldom stated explic-
itly, but whether acknowledged or not, it underlies most policy
debates and many theoretical analyses of how litigants react to jus-
tice system experiences. Economic analyses of procedures gener-
ally view litigants as concerned primarily with recoveries and pay-
outs and with how much it costs and how long it takes to resolve
the case. In policy debates, it is widely assumed that litigants' eval-
uations of courts and procedures are strongly influenced by
whether the litigant wins or loses the case. Policymakers often as-
sume that the only things that matter to litigants, beyond whether
they win or lose, are their litigation costs and the delay they en-
counter in obtaining a judgment. Indeed cost and delay are often
viewed as the major reasons for litigant discontent with the civil
justice system (e.g., Burger, 1982; Connolly and Smith, 1983; Pal-
more, 1981).
Some data are available from research in other contexts, how-
ever, that raise questions about the accuracy of these assumptions.
Studies of defendant reactions to criminal justice system proce-
dures (Casper et al., 1988; Landis and Goodstein, 1986; Tyler, 1984)
and of citizen reactions to encounters with police (Tyler, 1989;
Tyler and Folger, 1980) have examined the extent to which the ob-
jective outcome of the case-the sentence or fine imposed-drives
procedural justice judgments and outcome satisfaction. These stud-
ies have yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between
the objective outcome of the case and procedural justice judg-
ments: some studies show at least moderate correlations between
outcomes and perceived fairness, while others show no such corre-
lation. With respect to outcome satisfaction the data are more con-
sistent: most of the criminal justice studies have found moderate to
strong correlations between satisfaction and sentence.
In tort litigation the effects of case outcome might be stronger
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for plaintiffs than for defendants, because of differences in what is
at stake for each side of the dispute. Individual tort defendants are
usually insured, and the outcome of the litigation often has little
impact on defendants' immediate personal financial situation. Tort
plaintiffs, on the other hand, have more at stake personally, and
their reactions might therefore be more strongly affected by case
outcome.
The nature or form of the outcome might also influence liti-
gant evaluations of litigation experiences. Some commentators
(e.g., Hayden and Anderson, 1979; Menkel-Meadow, 1985a) have
suggested that adjudicatory judgments, which generally involve
explicit findings on liability, can leave the loser feeling blamed,
condemned, and humiliated, while procedures that involve com-
promise settlements achieved without explicit liability judgments
do not engender such feelings.1 Similarly the winning disputant in
a liability-finding procedure might experience a feeling of vindica-
tion. We tested this "vindication/condemnation" effect by compar-
ing disputant reactions under adjudicatory procedures to reactions
under more compromise-oriented procedures.2
Tort litigants' reactions to litigation costs and delay might be
affected by the fee arrangements that characterize tort litigation.
Like most defendants in personal injury tort cases, many defend-
ants we interviewed were represented by lawyers who were paid
by the defendant's insurer, and for such defendants personallitiga-
tion costs might be so small as to have little impact on their fair-
ness judgments and satisfaction. Tort plaintiffs, on the other hand,
pay their own attorney's fees. But because contingent fee arrange-
ments mean that large fees occur only when there are large
awards and because it is common in tort cases for the plaintiff to
receive a net award from which the lawyer has already subtracted
fees and costs, the absolute cost of the litigation might have less
impact on tort plaintiffs than would be the case under other billing
arrangements. Tort plaintiffs might be more concerned with the
contingent fee rate than the total fee amount. Similarly, delay
might also matter more to plaintiffs than to defendants, because it
is the plaintiff who must wait for his or her money if the case is
delayed.
The relation between cost and delay and litigant evaluations of
1 Another outcome-related issue concerns the "fit" of the settlement or
judgment with litigants' particular needs and situations. Some commentators
have claimed that because in compromise-oriented procedures, outcomes can
be shaped to fit the needs of the disputants, such procedures are more satisfy-
ing and thus more fair for the litigants (e.g., Menkel-Meadow, 1985a). We did
not measure this aspect of case outcomes, and therefore our study cannot
speak directly to this hypothesis. As noted below, however, we can and do ad-
dress the question of whether adjudicatory procedures lead to greater per-
ceived fairness and satisfaction than does bilateral settlement.
2 We use "adjudicatory" to refer to procedures in which a third party is-
sues a specific judgment on liability and damages; for our purposes the finality,
appealability, and enforceability of the judgment are not relevant.
HeinOnline -- 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 957 1990
LIND ET AL. 957
procedures takes on special significance because procedures such
as court-annexed arbitration and judicial settlement conferences
are often designed and adopted with the goal of reducing cost and
delay. Advocates of these procedures usually assume that if one
succeeds in reducing cost and delay, a variety of other benefits, in-
cluding greater litigant satisfaction, will necessarily follow (see,
e.g., Burger, 1982). But if satisfaction and perceived fairness are
not in reality linked to cost and delay, the procedural innovations,
however effective in achieving these goals, might fail to produce
improvements in perceived fairness and satisfaction.
B. Subjective Evaluations of Outcomes, Costs, and Delay
"Social exchange" and interdependence theories suggest that
outcomes are not judged on an objective scale but rather are evalu-
ated relative to personal standards or expectations (e.g., Adams,
1963, 1965; Blau, 1968; Homans, 1961; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978;
Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). For example, Thibaut and Kelley con-
tend that people feel satisfied when outcomes exceed a personal
standard or "comparison level" (based on expectations and per-
ceived just deserts) and dissatisfied when outcomes fall below that
level. Because social exchange theories generally view satisfaction
as a function of both the objective outcome and the individual's ex-
pectations, litigants with similar objective outcomes but different
expectations would be expected to show quite different levels of
satisfaction and perceived fairness. A similar line of reasoning
might be applied to the satisfaction and perceived fairness effects
of litigation costs and case duration. That is, what matters might
not be how much the case actually costs and how long it takes, but
rather whether it costs more and takes longer than seems reason-
able to the litigant (see, e.g., Helson, 1964). According to this line
of reasoning, outcome satisfaction and perceived procedural justice
should be enhanced by procedures that entail less cost and less de-
lay than the litigant expects.
C Alternative Views: Process and the Evaluation ofLitigation
Experiences
A rather different view of what drives litigants' evaluations of
the fairness of procedures is found in the work of procedural jus-
tice theorists (Brett, 1986; Lane, 1988; Leventhal, 1980; Lind and
Tyler, 1988; Thibaut and Walker, 1978). Although the theories
sometimes disagree about which specific factors are most impor-
tant to the perception of procedural justice, all agree that people
are remarkably sensitive to the process and procedures they expe-
rience in encounters with the law.
Several procedural justice theorists have suggested that per-
ceived control over the case outcome and the litigation process are
crucial factors in the perception of procedural fairness. Thibaut
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and Walker (1978), for example, argue that litigants view as fair
those procedures that give them control over the litigation process,
because high process control is seen as leading to fairer outcomes.
Leventhal (1980) suggests that people respond favorably to proce-
dures that seem likely to provide either accurate outcomes or out-
comes that favor the person in question (depending on the goals
the person brings to the situation), and this leads him to suggest
that procedural fairness judgments depend on the individual's con-
trol over the decision itself, the quality of representation, and the
carefulness of the procedure as a fact-finding process. Brett (1986)
views people as wanting control over the procedure's outcome so
that they can feel that they are in control of the dispute itself, and
she sees outcome control as one of the critical factors in the per-
ception of procedural fairness.
Other procedural justice theorists have pointed out additional
factors that might determine whether a procedure is seen as fair.
Lind and Tyler (1988: chap. 10) have suggested that the apparent
fairness of a procedure depends largely on symbolic features of the
procedure and the implications of these features for the social sta-
tus of the person in question. Lind and Tyler focus in particular on
whether a person receives dignified and respectful treatment when
they encounter a procedure. They argue that "dignitary process"
issues are extremely important to people because respectful and
dignified treatment implies that one is a full-fledged, valued mem-
ber of society. On the other hand, disrespectful or undignified
treatment threatens one's status and provokes the judgment that
the procedure is unfair. Lane (1988) advances a generally similar
view of the role of dignity in procedural fairness judgments: he
lists dignity of treatment as one of four major "procedural goods"
that citizens expect from their government.
The idea that being treated with respect and dignity is critical
to fair process is found also in legal theory. Legal analyses have
pointed to dignity as one of the values underlying due process con-
cerns (e.g., Mashaw, 1976, 1985; Michelman, 1973). These analyses
hold that a fundamental feature of due process is that the state ac-
cord those who bring cases to the courts a dignified hearing. The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the due process clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments recognizes this concern; in
many instances, the Court has required that notice, an opportunity
to be heard, and sometimes witness confrontation and cross-exami-
nation be accorded to individuals before or soon after decisions are
made that affect their property or liberty interests. In imposing
such requirements, the Court in essence relies on a political and
legal tradition that uses process to express a commitment to lim-
ited state power and to the protection of individuals' autonomy and
dignity.
The broader literature in law and society also suggests that
process factors play an important role in judgments of procedural
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fairness and satisfaction with outcomes. Anthropological and socio-
logical analyses of various dispute handling procedures suggest
that procedures that allow disputants to craft their own resolution
are more satisfying than are procedures that put the decision in
the hands of a third party (e.g., Gluckman, 1969; Gulliver, 1979;
Menkel-Meadow, 1985a; Nader, 1969; and Nader and Todd, 1978).3
Sociolegal work on disputing also emphasizes the importance of
the lawyer as a source of litigant impressions of procedures. Sarat
and Felstiner (1986), in a study of interaction between divorce law-
yers and their clients, found that lawyers often took credit for pos-
itive events and blamed the court system, its procedures, and its
judges for negative outcomes or slow progress. This work suggests
a potential link between evaluations of counsel and perceptions of
litigation procedures. If tort lawyers similarly attempt to improve
their own image at the expense of litigant perceptions of proce-
dural fairness, we would expect more positive evaluations of coun-
sel to be accompanied by less positive evaluations of the court and
its procedures.
The theory and rationale underlying the search for alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) procedures (see, e.g., Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution Working Group, 1986; Burger, 1982; Goldberg et
al., 1985; Marks et al., 1984; North Carolina Bar Association Task
Force, 1985; Pearson, 1984) also suggests that process factors are
important in evaluations of the fairness of legal procedures.4 ADR
advocates make a number of assumptions about how litigants view
trial procedures and ADR procedures, and these assumptions sug-
gest some process factors that might influence perceived fairness
and satisfaction. In particular, much of the argument in favor of
using ADR procedures involves remedying supposed shortcomings
of trial. Trial procedures are thought to be difficult for litigants to
understand, and therefore litigants are thought to view trial as an
alienating, uncomfortable experience. In addition, the procedural
complexity and formality of trial are thought to limit opportunities
for litigant participation in the litigation process.s It is often ar-
3 But it should be noted that litigant control is thought to be especially
desirable in disputes involving ongoing relationships (Felstiner, 1974;
Gluckman, 1969; Hayden and Anderson, 1979), a situation that rarely occurs in
tort litigation.
4 Note that our discussion here concerning ADR advocates' assertions in
policy debates is limited to debates concerning alternatives within the courts.
Many in the ADR movement would argue that true alternative dispute resolu-
tion must involve the use of procedures entirely outside the traditional litiga-
tion process.
5 Other analysts would argue that if the informality suggests that the
procedure does not allow for careful evaluation of the facts in the case, it
might lower perceived fairness and outcome satisfaction. As noted above, two
prominent theories of procedural justice (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut and
Walker, 1978) argue that the perceived accuracy of the procedure-its capacity
to generate an outcome that fits the fact situation in dispute--is very impor-
tant. According to these theories, if a procedure attempts to resolve the dis-
pute without taking care to make the outcome congruent with the facts, the
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gued that a procedure such as court-annexed arbitration, which
generally involves briefer, less formal hearings than do trials, will
be seen as fairer and more satisfying because litigants will be more
comfortable with the process, feel they can participate more, and
feel they understand more of what is going on (Burger, 1982;
North Carolina Bar Association Task Force, 1985).
D. Litigant Characteristics
A number of theoretical and policy analyses hypothesize that
different types of litigants might react differently to litigation pro-
cedures and outcomes. For example, Gilligan's (1979, 1982; see also
Menkel-Meadow, 1985b; Hardy, 1987; Resnik, 1988) analysis of gen-
der differences in views of morality suggests that women might
have different procedural justice standards than men: women may
well react more favorably to procedures that result in compromise,
while men might react more favorably to procedures that result in
all-or-nothing outcomes (Gilligan, 1979: 486). In addition, some pol-
icy debates about litigants' likely reactions to ADR procedures in-
clude assertions that litigants will view ADR procedures as "sec-
ond-class" justice in contrast to the full trial procedures provided
to those with disputes involving larger sums. These assertions raise
the possibility that disadvantaged litigants will react more nega-
tively to ADR procedures than do advantaged litigants. With these
issues in mind, we examined the relationships between a number
of litigant characteristics and perceptions of procedural justice and
outcome satisfaction.
III. BILATERAL SETILEMENT VERSUS THIRD-PARTY
PROCEDURES6
We studied litigants' reactions to traditional civil trials and to
two widely used alternative third-party procedures-court-an-
nexed arbitration and judicial settlement conferences-comparing
reactions to each third-party procedure with reactions to bilateral
settlement. Bilateral settlement is by far the most frequent
method of case resolution in tort cases, and until recently it has
been viewed widely as the best way to resolve a lawsuit. Much of
procedure will probably be seen as unfair and the outcome will be less satisfy-
ing. This position-that informality might be seen as unfair-is congruent
with the basic theme of some critiques of the widespread use of settlement-
promoting reforms (e.g., Fiss, 1984, 1987; Resnik, 1982, 1987), which argue that
the quality of justice may suffer from a focus on settling the case rather than
matching the outcome to the facts in the case.
6 Our use of ''bilateral settlement" should not be taken to mean that
there was no court involvement in the settlement process. For example, we
made no effort to exclude cases in which the terms of the settlement were
registered in some fashion with the court, nor do we wish to contend that
these settlements were not in part the result of court rules and schedules. We
simply mean that the cases had not had a third-party hearing or conference on
the substance of the case.
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the discussion above is relevant to arguments concerning litigant
reactions to bilateral settlement versus third-party procedures and
will not be repeated here. It is valuable to note, however, that a
number of law and society researchers (e.g., McEwen and Maiman,
1981,1982,1984,1986; Menkel-Meadow, 1985a) have suggested that
settlement, whether accomplished by the parties and their counsel
alone or assisted by judges or mediators, results in greater satisfac-
tion because the litigants are more involved in the settlement pro-
cess and because negotiated outcomes can be crafted to fit the liti-
gants' needs. Judges and judicial administrators have also argued
for bilateral settlement, suggesting that, relative to third-party
procedures, settlement leads to lower costs and less delay, which
will make the settlement popular with litigants.
Some recent empirical evidence reveals, however, that bilat-
eral settlements are not always as satisfying as these arguments
would suggest (Erlanger et al., 1987; see also Merry and Silbey,
1984). Further, procedural justice theorists (Lane, 1988; Leventhal,
1980; Lind and Tyler, 1988), who argue that litigant reactions are
driven by concerns about the dignity and carefulness of proce-
dures, might predict that third-party procedures would be seen as
more dignified and therefore as fairer than settlement.
Of course, litigants might view some third-party procedures as
fairer than bilateral settlement and others as less fair. The three
third-party procedures we studied differ in a number of ways. Ar-
bitration hearings and judicial settlement conferences are gener-
ally less formal and more private than are trials: rules of evidence
are not followed to the extent they are in trials, and, unlike trials
which are open to the public, it is very rare for anyone not in-
volved in the case to attend settlement conferences and arbitration
hearings of the sort we studied.7 Another difference is that, in con-
trast to arbitration hearings, trials are generally conducted by offi-
cial judges and result in verdicts that are binding unless appealed.
At trial, as in arbitration hearings, a third party renders a judg-
ment about liability and damages. In contrast, judicial settlement
conference agreements are negotiated compromises.
IV. PROCEDURES AND COURTS STUDIED8
A. Trial
We interviewed litigants whose cases had been tried in Fairfax
County, Virginia. Fairfax County, home to a relatively affluent
population, consists for the most part of suburban communities of
Washington, D.C. At the time of our study, attorneys in Fairfax
7 In fact, as noted below, in the settlement conferences we studied, even
the litigants were routinely excluded.
8 We describe the procedures as they were enacted during the time when
cases in the study were terminated (1983-84). For a discussion of the policy
issues surrounding the use of each procedure, see Lind et al., 1989.
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could expect rapid movement to trial once they certified their cli-
ents' cases as ready for trial. Trials of personal injury suits involv-
ing modest amounts of damages were generally conducted expedi-
tiously. No formal hearings or pretrial conferences were required
prior to trial. Almost all the trial litigants we interviewed had jury
trialS.9
B. Court-annexed Arbitration
We interviewed litigants whose cases had been arbitrated in
Bucks County, Pennsylvania, located in the outer suburban ring of
Philadelphia. Arbitration is well established in Bucks County: At
the time of the study about 90 percent of civil damage suits were
disposed of through the arbitration program. As in most Penn-
sylvania counties (Adler et al., 1983) and many other jurisdictions
with court-centered arbitration programs (Ebener and Betancourt,
1985; Hensler, 1986), arbitration hearings are held at the county
courthouse in jury deliberation rooms. Typically only plaintiffs
and defendants, their attorneys, and the arbitrators are present at
the hearings. Only rarely are other witnesses called. The hearings
are informal and brief (about forty-five minutes on average); each
side is given an opportunity to present its case, but there is little
procedural elaboration.
In Bucks County, civil cases are assigned to arbitration unless
the statement of damages accompanying the complaint exceeds
$20,000. Each arbitration panel is composed of three attorneys, who
must have a total of at least-and usually more than-ten years of
legal experience. Arbitrators are selected by the court and receive
no information about the cases prior to the hearings. The panel's
decision is nonbinding; disputants may reject the decision and
either settle the case or go to trial de novo. The arbitration award
is rejected in about 9 percent of the cases. The party requesting
trial de novo must post a $300 bond; if that party improves his or
her position by 10 percent or more, two-thirds of the bond ($200) is
refunded.
C Judicial Settlement Coriference
Prince Georges County, located in the Maryland portion of
Washington's suburban ring, was the site of the judicial settlement
conferences we studied. This county is less affluent and more ra-
cially mixed than the other two counties.lO At the time of the
9 All but four of the ninety-nine trial litigants in the final analytic sample
had jury trials; the remaining four litigants reported that their cases had been
tried by a judge without a jury.
10 If perceived fairness and satisfaction were strongly affected by income
or race, this difference might pose some problems for the research design. In
fact, as noted below, neither factor was found to be strongly correlated to fair-
ness judgments or satisfaction. In addition, because we compared ratings of
settlement conferences to ratings of settlements in the same county, which
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study the court was hard pressed to move cases to trial quickly. In
Prince Georges County, all personal injury suits, regardless of
monetary value, are assigned to the judicial settlement conference
procedure, a program, like others around the country, instituted
primarily to speed cases by reducing the trial rate. The confer-
ences are held by "settlement judges"-generally not the same
judges who preside at trial if cases go to trial.
Settlement judges view the conferences as bargaining sessions
that provide an opportunity for counsel to take a hard look at the
strengths and weaknesses of their cases and to get a neutral assess-
ment of the value of the case. Conferences generally last one hour
or less. Litigants are routinely excluded from the conferences: par-
ticipation of individual litigants is viewed as unnecessary and possi-
bly counterproductive.ll Lawyers are pressed to obtain authoriza-
tion for settlement-up to a reasonable anticipated amount-
before the conference or to assure that they can reach their clients
by phone during the conference. About 51 percent of the cases
reaching settlement conferences are settled at the conference or
after the conference but prior to trial.
The Prince Georges County judicial settlement conferences
are similar to those in metropolitan state courts in California (e.g.,
San Francisco, Santa Clara, Los Angeles, San Bernardino) and in
state courts in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York.
D. Bilateral Settlement
We studied reactions to trial, court-annexed arbitration, and
judicial settlement conference by conducting interviews with liti-
gants in three different courts. Given the differences in jurisdic-
tions, it was necessary to find some standard against which we
could assess reactions to the third-party procedures. We chose the
standard that is the most common alternative to all three proce-
dures: bilateral settlement prior to trial, arbitration, or settlement
conference. As we noted above, the comparison to bilateral settle-
ment has theoretical, as well as methodological, advantages. In
each county we interviewed litigants in cases that were similar to
those exposed to the third-party procedure but resolved prior to
exposure to the third-party procedure we studied in that county.12
had the same racial mix as the settlement conference procedure (20 percent of
the bilateral settlement sample and 23 percent of the settlement conference
sample in Prince Georges County were black), this difference could not have
produced spurious differences involving the settlement conference procedure.
11 Only five of the fifty-three settlement conference litigants in our final
analytic sample reported that they had attended the conference. Thus, the re-
sults of our study may not be applicable to settlement conferences regularly
attended by litigants.
12 Because the adjudicatory procedures tended to issue all-or-nothing ver-
dicts and the bilateral settlement procedure aimed explicitly at obtaining a
compromise, one might wonder whether these differences affected the compa-
rability of those interviewed in the Bucks and Fairfax settlement group. In
oarticular. if settlement produced fewer plaintiffs who walked away with no
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The Appendix presents further information on the sites, the
sample, and the research methods.
V. PROCEDURE DIFFERENCES IN LITIGANT REACfIONS13
In reporting our results, we consider first the differences that
we found in evaluations and perceptions of the various procedures.
We examine whether the procedures differed in the procedural
justice judgments they engendered and whether they differed in
terms of the litigants' satisfaction with outcomes. We then describe
how litigants perceived the litigation process under the various
procedures. In later sections we examine what factors appear to be
most closely correlated with judgments of procedural fairness and
with outcome satisfaction. We then examine which factors are
most successful at explaining the procedure differences we found
in perceived justice and satisfaction.
Before we describe our findings with respect to procedural dif-
ferences, some caveats are in order. First, it should be noted that
the within-court comparison approach we use here means that di-
rect comparisons between the three third-party procedures are not
possible using the values reported below, because such compari-
sons would include differences due to the court and county as well
as differences in the procedure the litigant experienced. Thus, rat-
ings of the three third-party procedures cannot be contrasted with
one another; instead ratings of each procedure has meaning only in
comparison with ratings of the bilateral settlement procedure in
that county.14
Further, the reader should keep in mind the possibility that
resolution of the case by the third-party procedure or bilateral set-
tlement might be caused by evaluations of the procedures rather
than being the cause of the evaluation. That is, a litigant might
money at all or more defendants who paid out something than did the corre-
sponding third-party procedures, and if "losers" in this sense were less likely
to agree to be interviewed than were "winners," the design might contami-
nated. We could not determine prior to the interview whether a prospective
litigant was a winner or a loser, so we cannot compare response rates across
the various counties and procedures. We did ask about the case outcome in
the interview, however, so we can determine whether there were any proce-
dure-specific differences in the proportion of winners and losers: there were
not.
13 We were primarily interested in cases terminated by the various third-
party procedures or bilateral settlement. There were, however, a few
respondents whose cases went to trial de novo after arbitration or settlement
conferences (five in Bucks County and nine in Prince Georges County). In the
analyses of procedural differences reported below, we excluded these
respondents from the arbitration and settlement conference cells; including
them in the analyses did not change the findings.
14 Of course, there are shortcomings to any solution to the problem of
generating a standard against which one can assess the meaning of interviews
such as those we conducted. Even if one eschews altogether an explicit com-
parison group of interviews, one is left with problems associated with compar-
ing responses to researcher expectations or theoretical predictions.
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have refused settlement and gone to arbitration, settlement con-
ference, or trial because he or she already regarded the third-party
procedure as fairer. Similarly, a litigant might have settled prior to
a third-party procedure because he or she viewed the third-party
procedure as unfair. For a number of reasons, however, we do not
think that such "self-selection" into procedures can account for
any of our major findings. Self-selection of this sort would logically
lead to favorable, but equal, ratings of the third-party procedures
and their respective settlement procedures, because each proce-
dure would be rated by litigants predisposed to favor that proce-
dure. As seen below, this pattern of results was not observed. One
would expect self-selection into procedures to result in across-the-
board elevation of the ratings across a number of characteristics of
the procedures. In fact, some rating scale means were high and
some were low. Finally, the specific pattern of ratings we observed
can be accounted for by existing theories without taking the self-
selection process into account. We describe below some analyses
which make it clear that differences in fairness and satisfaction
ratings can be accounted for by differences in perceptions of dig-
nity and evaluations of the case outcome relative to expectations,
and these findings accord well with procedural justice and social
exchange theories.
Note that the litigants could come to experience a third-party
procedure as the result of their opponent's unwillingness to settle
as well as a result of their own choices. Further, the litigants we
interviewed might have chosen to go to, or to avoid, the third-party
procedure not because they especially wanted to do so but because
their lawyers advised them to do so. All these considerations lead
us to believe that the differences we observed were caused by the
experience of the various procedures and were not artifacts of the
research design we used.
A. Procedural Justice Judgments
The litigants viewed trial and arbitration as fairer than bilat-
eral settlement.15 Litigants' procedural fairness ratings for judicial
settlement conferences were somewhat lower than were those for
bilateral settlement, but the difference was not statistically signifi-
15 The analysis of procedure differences in perceived fairness used an
overall analysis of variance with special contrasts comparing ratings by respon-
dents who had experienced each third-party procedure with the ratings of re-
spondents who experienced settlement procedures in the same county. The
overall ANOVA also included contrasts designed to remove intercounty varia-
tion, insofar as was possible, in order to remove variation that would otherwise
have contributed to the error term, and a test of variation attributable to the
litigant's role as defendant or plaintiff. The role test was significant (F (I,
256) = 6.43, p < .02), because defendants rated all procedures higher than did
plaintiffs. None of the effects in Table 3 showed any significant interaction
with the litigant's role (all F <1.0), indicating that the effects in Table 3 apply
to both roles.
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cant. Table 1 shows the mean procedural justice rating for each
third-party procedure and each county's matched bilateral settle-
ment group. Judgments of the relative fairness of the procedures
did not differ depending on the litigant's gender, race,16 income, or
employment statUS.17






















satisfaction 2.24 2.23 2.27 2.17 2.12 2.63
rating (F<1.0) (F<1.0) (F=4.07, p<.045)
NOTE: All ratings are on 4-point scales with higher numbers indicating greater
perceived fairness or satisfaction. Because the reported means may include differ-
ences that are due to the county, as well as differences due to the procedure the
litigant was rating, the means should be compared only within counties, not across
counties.
B. Outcome Satisfaction Ratings
Only one of the procedure comparisons-that contrasting set-
tlement conferences with bilateral settlement-showed a signifi-
cant effect on outcome satisfaction. As can be seen from Table 1,
the judicial settlement conference litigants were significantly less
satisfied with their outcomes than were the Prince Georges
County bilateral settlement litigants.IS In contrast, there were no
substantial differences between the outcome satisfaction ratings
for trial and arbitration and those for the corresponding bilateral
settlement groups.
We tested for gender, race,19 income, and employment-status
differences in outcome satisfaction ratings under the various pro-
16 Because in Bucks and Fairfax counties there were few minority re-
spondents, we could not test whether minority respondents differed in their
evaluations of the fairness of the arbitration and trial procedures relative to
bilateral settlement. In Prince Georges County, where there were enough mi-
nority respondents to test for differences, we found no significant race differ-
ence in ratings of judicial settlement conferences and bilateral settlement.
17 The maximum F-value for interactions of procedure and these per-
sonal characteristics was 1.50, not significant.
18 The analysis of variance for outcome satisfaction also showed a signifi-
cant effect for the litigant's party role (F (1, 250) = 13.16, p < .001), resulting, as
did a similar effect on procedural justice, from higher ratings by defendants
than plaintiffs. There were, however, no significant interactions between the
role factor and the procedure.
19 The litigants' race did not affect the higher outcome satisfaction rat-
ings for bilateral settlement relative to judicial settlement conferences. (Re-
call that Prince Georges County, the judicial settlement conference court, was
the only court with enough minority litigants to test for racial differences.)
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cedures. None of these personal characteristics changed the out-
come satisfaction ratings engendered by the four procedures.20
C Procedure and Perceptions of the Litigation Process
To explore further how litigants viewed the procedures, we
asked about their impressions of seven process-related features of
the litigation experience: the litigants' control over events, their
evaluation of their attorney, whether the procedure was dignified,
whether the procedure was careful, whether they understood the
procedure, whether they felt comfortable with the procedure, and
the extent to which they felt they had participated in the process.
Table 2 shows how the litigants viewed each procedure with re-
spect to the seven process perception measures.
As one might expect, trials were seen as more dignified and
more careful than bilateral settlements. Litigants in trials also re-
ported that they understood the litigation process better and that
they felt they participated more than did litigants in bilateral set-
tlement cases. There was no indication that the litigants either felt
less in control or less comfortable with trials than with bilateral
settlements: neither measure showed any significant difference be-
tween the two groups.
The arbitration and judicial settlement conference procedures
differ from bilateral settlement on only a few of the process per-
ception variables. The litigants were somewhat more likely to de-
scribe the procedure as dignified under arbitration than under bi-
lateral settlement.21 Judicial settlement conferences were more
likely to leave litigants feeling uncomfortable about the process
than were bilateral settlements.
Finally, note that the means for the litigant control ratings are
relatively low for all litigants, and that ratings of understanding of
the procedure are relatively high for all litigants.
VI. CORRELATES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
How, in general, do the various factors we studied relate to
procedural justice judgments? We examined the relationship be-
tween the litigants' fairness judgments and (1) measures of objec-
tive and subjective outcome, cost, and delay;22 (2) measures of per-
ceptions of the litigation process (see the Appendix for the
wording of the questions); and (3) characteristics of the litigant.
Table 3 shows the relationship of each major variable to the proce-
dural justice ratings.
20 The maximum F-value for interactions with procedure and these per-
sonal characteristics was 1.50, not significant.
21 The test of this difference falls just short of statistical significance, but
the difference is significant in the more sensitive structural equation analyses
reported below.
22 The measures of objective outcome and cost are the litigant's personal
pay-out or receipts from the litigation.
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Table 2. Perceptions of Procedures
Rating Scale
Prince Georges
Fairfax County Bucks County County
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
2.09 1.95 1.83 1.92 1.93 1.95
(F<1.0) (F<1.0) (F<1.0)
2.94 2.69 2.89 3.09 2.96 3.08
(F=1.l7, n.s.) (F<1.0) (F<1.0)
3.13 2.16 2.48 2.26 2.88 3.20
(F=11.51, p<.ool) (F<1.0) (F=1.33, n.s.)
3.70 3.25 3.42 3.21 3.11 3.00
(F=5.23,p<.OO5) (F<1.0) (F<1.0)
2.86 2.10 2.25 2.00 2.51 2.28
(F=9.43, p<.002) (F<1.0) (F<1.0)
88.8 56.5 83.8 66.7 78.9 80.6
(Chi-square= (Chi-square = (Chi-square=

























NOTE: For indices and ratings entries are means of 4-point scales with higher
numbers indicating greater perceived fairness or satisfaction. For dichotomous vari-
ables (dignified & comfortable) entries are affirmative responses as a percentage of
valid responses. Because the reported means may include differences that are due
to the county, as well as differences due to the procedure the litigant was rating,
the means should be compared only within counties, not across counties.
A. Objective and Subjective Outcome, Cost, and Case Duration
1. Objective Factors. Some of the more striking findings of the
current study involve the absence of expected correlations involv-
ing procedural justice judgments. Especially remarkable is the
finding that there was no consistent relationship between proce-
dural justice judgments and the objective measures of case out-
come, litigation cost, or case duration.23 As can be seen from Table
23 The absence of any correlation between perceived fairness and case du-
ration might have been an artifact of our way of measuring case duration, but
additional analyses show this to be unlikely. Because we did not have readily
available information on the case filing date, we measured case duration as the
time from the tort incident to the conclusion of the case. (We reasoned also
that it would be the time from the incident, rather than the time from case
filing, that would be most salient to the litigants.) If, however, a long time
passed between the incident and the case's final resolution before the tort sys-
tem was activated, there might be reason to expect that delay, as we have de-
fined it, would not affect satisfaction or fairness judgments. Delay in taking
the claim to the lawyer might not be blamed on the civil justice systed1 and
would not be expected to be correlated with procedural justice judgments.
The data we do have on whether the litigants delayed substantially in pressing
their claims suggest that litigants did not delay much at all in activating the
tort system. We asked litigants represented by their own lawyer (i.e., the
plaintiffs and the few uninsured defendants) how long after the incident they
had hired the lawyer. Responses showed that the litigants acted quite quickly
to activate the tort system, at least insofar as hiring a lawyer constitutes acti-
vating the system. The median time from the incident to hiring the lawyer
was only 14 days; the mean, which is particularly sensitive to the long delays,
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Table 3. Correlates of Procedural Justice Judgments
Prince Georges
Fairfax County Bucks County County
Variable r Beta r Beta r Beta
Outcome-related variables
Case outcome .17 -.024 .23 .128 .01 .013
Own cost .08 .147* .17 .083 -.06 -.058
Case duration -.03 -.092 -.13 -.007 -.12 -.125
Subjective outcome .55" .597" .41" .415** .42** .418**
Subjective cost -.08** .007 .06 -.081 -.27 -.266
Subjective duration -.17 -.209 -.06 .036 -.25* -.250*
Variance accounted for (R 2 ) .373 .209 .252
Process perceptions
Litigant control .34** .192" .42** .325** .41" .406"
Evaluation of attorney .36** .088 .SO" .332** .56** .564**
Procedure dignified .54** .301" .54" .397** .48** .480**
Procedure careful .48** .175 .48** .151 .49" .486"
Understood procedure .10 .051 .17 -.080 .21" .209
Comfortable with procedure .44" .121 .25* .296** .SO** .497**
Participated in process .10 -.151 .21 -.018 .08 .080
Variance accounted for (R 2) .389 .498 .S03
Litigant characteristics
Education .18* .160 .02 -.038 .01 .055
Age -.12 -.128 .08 .186 -.16 -.203*
Gender -.21* -.176 .14 .175 .14 .319**
Race .13 .183
Family income .16 .133 .07 .006 .09 .088
Employed/not employed -.15 .043 -.03 -.210 -.32* -.477**
Married/not married .07 .078 .05 .058 .02 .155
Variance accounted for (R 2) .101 .048 .266
NOTE: Values in the "r" columns show the simple correlation between each varia-
ble and the procedural justice measure; values in the ''beta'' columns are the stan-
dardized regression coefficients from a regression equation predicting the procedur-
al justice measure from the variables in the category in question.
* p < .05. **p<.Ol.
3, there were no significant correlations and only one significant
regression coefficient involving the objective measures.24
It might be argued that the absence of any correlation be-
tween objective outcome or cost and procedural fairness judgments
is the result of our focus on tort litigants. We noted above that the
insurance and attorney fee arrangements customary in tort litiga-
tion might mitigate against strong effects for outcomes or costs.
However, additional analyses show that the relationship of proce-
is only 91 days. In contrast, the median time from the incident to the termina-
tion of the case was 731 days, and the mean was 839 days. Thus, it appears
that most of the delay occurred after litigants had taken their case to the jus-
tice system.
24 The correlations and regression coefficients reported in Tables 3 and 4
and those used in the structural equation analyses are based on biserial or
bichoric correlations when one of the variables is dichotomous; otherwise they
are based on normalized Pearson correlations. The one exception is the use of
normalized Pearson correlations for the dichotomous measure of process dig-
nity in analyses of the Bucks County data because one biserial correlation in-
volving the dignity rating could not be estimated, probably because of the rela-
tively smail sample in that county.
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dural justice with measures of objective outcome and cost is weak.
even among those litigants one might expect to be sensitive to out-
comes and costs. The data show that even for litigants who person-
ally paid out or received substantial amounts, objective outcomes
and cost are not strongly related to fairness judgments. For exam-
ple, plaintiffs' procedural fairness judgments were not linked more
strongly to their outcomes than were those of defendants (for
plaintiffs, r=.18, n.s., n=133; for defendants, r=.04, n.s., n=108),
nor were plaintiffs' procedural justice judgments more strongly
linked to their legal costs than were those of defendants (for plain-
tiffs, r=.13, n.s., n=110; for defendants, r=.Ol, n.s., n=127).25 Nor
were plaintiffs' procedural fairness judgments significantly related
to the contingent fee rate they paid (r=.l1, n.s., n=116). Among
the relatively small sample of defendants who personally paid part
or all of the judgment or settlement, there was no significant cor-
relation between the case outcome and their procedural justice
judgments (r=.12, n.s., n=20), nor was there among those defend-
ants who paid at least some of their own legal costs any significant
correlation between what they paid and procedural justice judg-
ments (r=.19, n.s., n=19).
For neither defendants nor plaintiffs was there any substan-
tial correlation between case duration and procedural justice judg-
ments (for plaintiffs, r=-.07, n.s., n=123; for defendants r=-.08,
n.s., n=lOl).
We noted above that it has long been suspected that litigants'
reactions to adjudicatory procedures might be affected by the sim-
ple fact of winning or losing the case, because adjudicatory proce-
dures tend to fix blame on one party or the other. We computed
the correlation between procedural justice judgments and a dichot-
omous code of whether the respondent's side had won or lost the
case26 and found that the correlation was stronger (r=.27, p< .001,
n=138) for respondents who experienced the adjudicatory proce-
dures (trial and arbitration) than for those who experienced the
nonadjudicatory (settlement conference and bilateral settlement)
procedures (r=.04, n.s., n=96). That is, the difference between the
procedural justice judgments of winners and those of losers was
stronger in the adjudicatory procedures than in the nonadjudi-
25 As expected from the prevalence of contingent fee arrangements, the
legal costs of the plaintiffs were substantially correlated with outcomes from
the case (r=.64, p<.OOl, n=107). (Here and elsewhere, the overall correla-
tions across all three counties are based on data that have been standardized
within each county.)
26 The win-lose index was constructed by counting as having "won" any
plaintiff who obtained any monetary award or settlement and any defendant
whose side paid nothing. Plaintiffs who received no money and defendants
who paid out anything were counted as having "lost." The index is admittedly
less than perfect-some plaintiffs who receive small payments relative to the
injuries they suffered may have good reason to feel they have lost and some
defendants who make small payments relative to the plaintifrs injuries may
feel they have won.
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catory procedures. Even in the adjudicatory procedures, however,
this "vindication/condemnation" effect was not strong. Further,
the finding that perceived fairness was higher in the two adjudica-
tory procedures than in the matched bilateral settlement groups
suggests that whatever negative effect an adjudicatory decision has
on losers' perceptions of the fairness of procedures, that effect was
more than offset by other, more attractive, features of the adjudi-
catory procedures.
2. Subjective Assessments. Subjective evaluations of case out-
comes did show a substantial relationship with procedural justice
judgments in all three counties, but subjective evaluations of case
delay and litigation costs did not show any consistent relationship
to procedural justice judgments. It may seem inconsistent that sub-
jective evaluations of outcomes are correlated with procedural jus-
tice judgments while the objective measure of outcomes is not. In
reality, there is no inconsistency, because subjective evaluations of
the outcome showed only a very weak correlation with actual out-
comes (r=.16, p< .05, n=234). Apparently much of the variation
in subjective outcomes is due to variation in litigants' expectations
rather than to variation in the outcomes themselves. Similarly,
there was no significant correlation between subjective assess-
ments of cost and delay and the corresponding objective measures
of cost and case duration (r=-.01, n.s., n=124, for subjective and
objective costs; r=.l1, n.s., n=222, for subjective and objective du-
ration).
When entered together as a group in the regression equation,
the objective and subjective measures of case outcome, cost, and
duration account for between 21 and 37 percent of the variation in
procedural justice judgments. These variables are, by and large,
worse predictors of the litigants' procedural fairness judgments
than are the process perception variables, but they are better
predictors than are litigant characteristics. Procedural justice judg-
ments are linked much more strongly to subjective assessments of
outcomes, cost, and delay than to objective measures-most or all
of the relationship between outcome, cost, and delay variables and
procedural justice judgments is due to the strong relationship be-
tween fairness judgments and subjective evaluations of the out-
come.
To the extent that procedural justice judgments are linked to
outcomes, then, what appears to matter most is the outcome rela-
tive to expectations, not the objective magnitude of the outcome, a
finding that is generally supportive of social exchange theories. In
light of the frequent assertion that litigants are unhappy with
traditional procedures because of the cost and delay they entail, it
is noteworthy that neither objective nor subjective measures of
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cost and delay showed much relationship with procedural justice
judgments.27
B. Perceptions ofLitigation Process
Perceptions of the litigation process account for much (39 to
50 percent) of the variation in procedural justice judgments, as can
be seen from Table 3. Perceptions of control over the case outcome
and the litigation process were consistently related to procedural
justice judgments. Because psychological and anthropological anal-
yses of the importance of control differ with respect to which type
of control is more closely related to procedural justice judgments,
we examined the correlation of procedural justice judgments with
each control item separately. We found that both decision and pro-
cess control were correlated with procedural justice and that both
were correlated to about the same degree (for decision control,
r=.31, p<.001, n=280; for process control, r=.37, p<.001, n=280).
We also tested whether the correlation between procedural fair-
ness and the control measures varied depending on whether the
litigant had some previous relationship with his or her opponent,
and we found--contrary to what one would expect from analyses
that emphasize control in ongoing relations--that perceptions of
control were as highly correlated with procedural justice in the
context of stranger-to-stranger disputes (r=.31, P< .01, n=235, for
outcome control; r=.37, p< .01, n=235, for process control; r=.38,
P< .01, n=235, for the overall control index) as they were in dis-
putes involving those who were previously acquainted (r= .33, P<
.03, n=45, for outcome control; r=.39, P< .01, n=45, for process
control; r=.40, P< .01, n=45, for the overall control index).
As shown in Table 3, evaluations of the attorney were posi-
tively correlated with procedural justice judgments. While some of
the analyses reported later offer support, in one county at least,
for the idea that more favorable evaluations of one's lawyer lead to
less favorable evaluations of court procedures, by and large liti-
gants viewed court procedures more favorably when they evalu-
ated their lawyers positively.
Perceptions of the dignity of the procedure showed a consis-
tent and strong relationship with procedural justice judgments.
Litigants were substantially more likely to view the procedure as
fair when they felt the litigation process was dignified.
Procedural justice judgments were consistently correlated
with the litigants' ratings of how comfortable they were with the
27 It is not, of course, that the delay and expense of litigation do not mat-
ter to litigants, only that litigants do not appear to base their evaluations of
the litigation experience on delay and cost considerations. In fact, litigants
may view long delays and high costs as unfortunate, but unavoidable, features
of any involvement with litigation, and they may look to other, more variable,
features of the litigation experience when they think about fairness and satis-
faction.
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procedure. However, the regression coefficients for the comfort
ratings were not significant in any of the three counties, suggesting
that the correlation can be attributed to the relationship of ratings
of comfort with other variables in the process perception regres-
sion equation. Feelings of comfort might be driven by other per-
ceptions, such as feelings of control or dignity, which also correlate
strongly with the procedrual justice judgments.
Perceptions of procedural care showed strong correlations
with procedural justice in all three counties but did not show sig-
nificant regression coefficients. The nonsignificant regression coef-
ficients suggest that perceptions of procedural care are correlated
with procedural justice by virtue of the relationship of procedural
care with some other process perception variable.
To summarize, litigants' perceptions of the process-especially
their perceptions of the control they exercised, their perceptions of
the dignity of the process, their evaluations of their counsel, and
their comfort with the process-were strongly correlated with
their procedural justice judgments. The strong relationship be-
tween procedural dignity and procedural fairness judgments sup-
ports procedural justice theories that emphasize the importance of
dignitary process concerns. The substantial correlations between
procedural justice judgments and perceived control provide sup-
port for theories that view litigants as concerned about their con-
trol over litigation events and outcomes.
C Litigant CharacteristiC3
The litigants' personal characteristics had little effect on their
procedural justice judgments. As shown in Table 3, none of the lit-
igant characteristic variables showed a consistent correlation with
the fairness ratings. Taken as a group, litigant characteristics could
account for only between 5 and 27 percent of the variation in pro-
cedural justice judgments. There is not much support in these data
for supposing that the litigant's education, age, gender, race, in-
come, employment status, or marital status affects his or her fair-
ness judgments, a finding that is congruent with a recent study of
tort litigants' reactions to court-annexed arbitration (MacCoun et
al., 1988: 64-66).28
VII. CORRELATES OF OUTCOME SATISFACfION
Table 4 shows the correlations of each of the major variables
with the litigants' ratings of their satisfaction with the outcome, as
well as standardized regression weights from equations predicting
outcome satisfaction from each group of variables.
28 Of course, this does not mean that blacks or women or any other group
were really treated as fairly as were others--only that members of these
groups did not believe that the procedures they encountered were less fair
than did other groups.
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Table 4. Correlates of Outcome Satisfaction Judgments
Prince Georges
Fairfax County Bucks County County
Variable r Beta r Beta r Beta
Outcome-related variables
Case outcome .41· .115· .41·· .348" -.07 .356··
Own cost -.10 .039 .15 -.074 -.25· -.430"
Case duration .05 .032 -.18 -.030 -.16 -.197·
Subjective outcome .78" .774·· .66·· .561·· .55" .580··
Subjective cost .20" .309" .25 .051 -.05 .235"
Subjective duration .03 -.036 -.20 -.119 -.26· -.089
Variance accounted for (R~ .706 .545 .443
Pro<:ess perceptions
Litigant control .38" .348" .41·· .276· .43·· .380"
Evaluation of attorney .SO" .345·· .39" .198 .54·· .385··
Procedure dignified .45·· .451·· .29· .OSO .23· -.048
Procedure careful .29·· -.135 .23 .027 .38· .084
Understood procedure -.10 -.122 .12 -.081 .13 -.141
Comfortable with
procedure .31·· -.077 .43·· .185 .26·· .100
Participated in process .06 -.340·· .12 -.056 .16 -.083
Variance accounted for (R 2) .481 .274 .386
Litigant characteristics
Education .06 .048 .19 -.099 -.01 .117
Age -.16 -.116 -.04 .119 -.23· -.297·
Gender -.20· -.196 .23 .226 .27· .367··
Race .03 .052
Family income .05 .065 .11 .026 -.14 -.114
Employed/not employed -.15 .044 -.12 -.269 -.03 -.174
Married/not married .15 .138 .28· .277· .08 -.075
Variance accounted for (R 2) .078 .178 .182
NOTE: Values in the "y' columns show the simple correlation between each varia-
ble and the outcome satisfaction rating;. values in the "beta" columns are the stan-
dardized regression coefficients from a regression equation predicting the outcome
satisfaction rating from the variables in the category in question.
·p<.05. •• p < .01.
A. Objective and Subjective Outcome, Cost, and Case Duration
Outcome satisfaction correlated most strongly with the mea-
sure of subjective outcomes, that is, with ratings of where the out-
come fell relative to expectations. We found smaller and less con-
sistently significant correlations between outcome satisfaction and
the objective outcome of the case and between satisfaction and
both subjective and objective evaluations of litigation costs. The
measures of case duration, whether objective or subjective, showed
little relation to outcome satisfaction. Taken together, subjective
and objective measures of outcome and related variables account
for a large proportion of the variation in outcome satisfaction
(44-71 percent), but the pattern of correlations and regression
weights makes it clear that it is the subjective evaluation of out-
comes, not the objective outcome, that matters most for satisfac-
tion. As we noted above, subjective evaluations of outcomes
showed little correlation with actual outcomes.
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1. Objective Factors. We examined the relationship between
outcome satisfaction and objective outcomes, costs, and case dura-
tion within subgroups of litigants that might be especially sensitive
to these factors. Plaintiffs' outcome satisfaction ratings were no
more highly correlated with their objective outcomes than were
those of defendants (r=.29, p<.OOl, n=132, for plaintiffs; r=.25,
p< .01, n=107, for defendants). Nor were plaintiffs' objective liti-
gation costs correlated more strongly with their outcome satisfac-
tion than those of defendants (r=-.03, n.s., n=108, for plaintiffs;
r=.13, n.s., n=122, for defendants). Plaintiffs' outcome satisfaction
ratings showed no relationship to the contingent fee rate they paid
(r=-.Ol, n.s., n=115). Defendants who paid their own legal costs
showed no significant correlation between those costs and their
outcome satisfaction (r=.05, n.s., n=19), nor did defendants who
themselves paid all or part of the settlement or judgment show
any significant correlation between the objective outcome and
their satisfaction with it (r=.14, n.s., n=20).
As was the case with procedural justice judgments, the out-
come satisfaction ratings provided no support for the notion that
defendants react negatively and plaintiffs positively to rapid reso-
lution of the case: there was no significant correlation between
outcome satisfaction and case duration for either group of litigants
(r=-.08, n.s., n=122, for plaintiffs; r=-.03, n.s., n=98, for defend-
ants).
The outcome satisfaction judgments showed a "vindication/
condemnation" effect similar to that seen in the analyses of proce-
dural fairness judgments. The outcome satisfaction ratings of liti-
gants who experienced adjudicatory procedures were more highly
correlated with simply winning or losing the case than were the
satisfaction ratings of litigants who experienced nonadjudicatory
procedures (for adjudicatory procedures, r=.45, p < .001, n=136;
for nonadjudicatory procedures, r=.13, n.s., n=96). The "vindica-
tion/condemnation" effect on outcome satisfaction was somewhat
stronger than that observed on procedural fairness judgments.
2. Subjective Assessments. Where the outcome falls relative to
expectations appears to be the most important factor in outcome
satisfaction. The low correlation between actual outcomes and out-
come evaluations relative to expectations (reported above) sug-
gests that much of the variation in subjective evaluations of out-
comes, and hence much of the variation in outcome satisfaction,
comes from differences in litigants' expectations about the out-
come.
These findings favor more subjective models of satisfaction
over those positing direct links between objective outcomes and lit-
igant satisfaction. For this reason, social exchange theories, which
emphasize evaluations of outcomes relative to expectations, fit the
data better than do theories that hold that it is the objective out-
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come, cost, or duration of a case that determines whether litigants
are satisfied.
B. Perceptions ofLitigation Process
Process perceptions were correlated with outcome satisfaction
less strongly than were the outcome-related variables but more
strongly than were litigant characteristics: process perceptions
could account for 27-48 percent of the variation in outcome satis-
faction.
Among the process perception variables, those suggested by
control-oriented analyses of legal attitudes were most closely and
most consistently related to outcome satisfaction. Perceptions of
litigant control over the process and outcome showed substantial
correlations with outcome satisfaction. Examination of the two
scales that make up the overall litigant control index showed that
both control over the process and control over the decision were
correlated with outcome satisfaction (for process control, r= .31,
p<.OOl, n=273; for decision control, r=.41, p<.OOl, n=273). Eval-
uations of one's attorney also showed substantial correlations with
satisfaction with the outcome.
Perceptions of the dignity of the procedure and of procedural
care and feelings of comfort with the procedure also showed signif-
icant correlations with outcome satisfaction. For these three
perceptual dimensions, however, the regression coefficients were
generally not significant, suggesting that the relationships revealed
by the correlations were due to other factors, probably perceptions
of control, which were related both to these process perceptions
and to outcome satisfaction.
C Litigant Characteristics
As was the case with judgments of procedural fairness, out-
come satisfaction ratings showed little or no consistent correlation
with any of the litigant characteristics we studied. There was no
consistent correlation between outcome satisfaction and the educa-
tion, age, gender, race, income, employment status, or marital sta-
tus of the respondent.
VIII. MODELS OF PERCEIVED FAIRNESS AND
SATISFACTION
We used structural equation analyses (Joreskog and Sorbom,
1988) to examine which variables could explain the procedural
fairness advantage of trials and arbitration hearings over bilateral
settlements and the outcome satisfaction advantage of bilateral
settlements over settlement conferences. We first computed struc-
tural equation models for each county with procedure and party as
exogenous variables and with procedural justice (for Fairfax and
Bucks counties) or outcome satisfaction (for Prince Georges
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County) as the final endogenous variable.29 The models included
as intermediate (explanatory) variables any of the objective and
subjective outcome, cost, and delay measures or process perception
variables that showed significant correlations and significant re-
gression weights for the fairness or satisfaction variable, depending
on which effect the model was attempting to explain.30 In estimat-
ing the initial models, we assumed that the intermediate variables
explained all of the procedure-based variation in fairness or satis-
faction; no direct link was specified between the procedure and
fairness or satisfaction. We estimated the model parameters using
a maximum likelihood technique. Next, we redefined the models
excluding all intermediate variables that showed no substantial
causal links (t< 1.5) with the fairness or satisfaction variable.3! Fi-
nally, we reestimated these second-round models, allowing a direct
link between the procedure variable and fairness or satisfaction, in
order to test whether the intermediate variables did indeed ex-
plain all of the procedure-based variation in fairness or satisfac-
tion.32
Figure 1, A-C, shows the results of these analyses. The values
given are standardized path coefficients, which provide an index of
the strength of each link in the causal chain; the arrows represent
statistically significant paths.33 If a variable explains the proce-
dure-based differences in fairness or satisfaction, it should show
significant paths linking it to both the procedure and to fairness or
satisfaction: that is, both paths involving the variable should be sig-
nificant. In addition, if the variables in a particular model explain
all of the procedure-based variation in fairness or satisfaction, the
29 The procedural justice variable was the two-scale index; the outcome
satisfaction variable was the single rating scale on satisfaction with the final
outcome. For multiple-scale variables the structural equation analyses took
into account the scale reliability computed within the county in question; for
single-scale variables an arbitrary reliability of .80 was used.
30 The term of art for such variables in psychology is "mediator" vari-
ables. Note that these tests of models assume that the variables are ordered
causally with the procedural difference causing changes in the intermediate
variables and these variables causing changes in the litigant evaluation vari-
ables; the present study cannot prove that ordering. In other words, we can
test whether a variable is an empirically reasonable explanation of the proce-
dure differences if the variables are ordered as assumed in the model. But in a
study of this sort we cannot test definitively the ordering itself. That would
require a randomized experimental design or a series of observations over
time.
31 There was one deviation from this elimination process. In the model
for the Bucks County data, the second-round model as originally estimated in-
cluded comfort with procedure. However, this model did not fit the data. Ex-
clusion of comfort with procedure resulted in a very good level of fit and ex-
plained the direct effect of arbitration versus settlement, so it is this latter
model that is reported in Fig. 1, B.
32 We also tested whether the intermediate variables in the final models
showed significant correlations with the fairness or satisfaction measure
within each procedure condition in question. In every instance these within-
condition correlations were also significant.
33 Nonsignificant paths are not included in the figures.
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C. Satisfaction with Bilateral Settlement vs. Satisfaction with
Judicial Settlement Conference
Figure 1. Causal model for the advantage (A) in procedural fairness of trial over
bilateral settlement, (B) in procedural fairness of arbitration over
bilateral settlement, and (C) in satisfaction of bilateral settlement over
judicial settlement conferences.
path leading directly from the procedure contrast to fairness or
satisfaction should be nonsignificant and the path coefficient for
that path should approach zero.
Consider first the model that seeks to explain the higher pro-
cedural fairness ratings for trials than bilateral settlements in
Fairfax County. The model that produced the trial effect values in
Figure 1, A, showed a very good level of fit with the data.34 Two
34 Chi-square (2) = .01, p > .90, the goodness of fit index (GFI) for this
model = .99, the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) = .99; for the model ex-
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intermediate variables-evaluations of the attorney and dignity of
the procedure--are good explanations of the procedural justice ef-
fects of trial. The role of dignity is straightforward: trials are seen
as more dignified than bilateral settlements, and this greater dig-
nity produces higher procedural justice ratings, a finding that sup-
ports theories and research that emphasize the importance of dig-
nitary process concerns for the perception of procedural justice
(Lane, 1988; Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1988, 1989, 1990). The ef-
fects of evaluations of the attorney are more complicated. Attor-
neys were evaluated more positively when the case was tried,35 but
these higher evaluations lead to lower procedural justice judg-
ments. The negative causal link between evaluation of the attor-
ney and procedural justice judgments is congruent with recent re-
search by Sarat and Felstiner (1986), who suggest that lawyers
warn their clients about the dangers of all formal process, but par-
ticularly trials, as they attempt to enhance their clients' impres-
sions of the quality of their own services. The paths linking trials, .
evaluations of the attorney, and procedural justice judgments
would have resulted in lower fairness ratings for trials than for bi-
lateral settlement, absent the effect of perceived dignity. Because
the positive effect of trials on feelings of dignity was so strong,
however, it more than compensated for the negative attorney eval-
uation effect.36
The structural equation model for the arbitration effect is sim-
ple: The procedural fairness advantage of arbitration over bilateral
settlement is explained by perceptions of the dignity of the proc-
ess. The arbitration-settlement structural equation model shown in
Figure 1, B, showed very good fit with the data.37 Arbitration hear-
ings were seen as more dignified than bilateral settlement, and
perceptions of procedural dignity in tum had a substantial effect
on fairness judgments.36 These findings, together with those for
the trial-versus-settlement contrast, are very favorable to theories
cluding the direct link between the trial-settlement contrast and procedural
fairness judgments, chi-square (3)=.04, p>.90, GFI=.99, AGFI=.99.
35 That this effect appears in these analyses but not in the analyses of va-
riance test of procedural differences may be due to the greater sensitivity of
tests in structural equations analyses, or it may be that the effect is evident
only when the analysis controls for the variance in procedural justice that is
explained by perceptions of procedural dignity.
36 The final causal model showed no significant direct path between the
trial versus bilateral settlement contrast and procedural justice judgments,
showing that perceived dignity and attorney evaluations can account for all of
the procedural justice advantage of trials.
37 Chi-square (2) = .01, P >.90, GFI = .99; AGFI = .99; for the model exclud-
ing the direct link between the arbitration-settlement contrast and procedural
fairness judgments, chi-square (3)=.04, p>.90, GFI=.99, AGFI=.99.
38 The nonsignificant direct link between the arbitration-settlement con-
trast and procedural fairness judgments shows that perceptions of procedural
dignity are sufficient to explain the arbitration effect.
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that argue that dignitary process concerns are an important aspect
of procedural justice.
The model for the adverse effect of settlement conferences on
outcome satisfaction (Fig. 1, C)-shows that subjective outcome
differences are the best explanation of the effect. As was the case
with the two preceding models, the settlement conference model
showed good fit with the data.39 There was a significant negative
link. between judgments of where the outcome fell relative to ex-
pectations and the settlement conference-settlement contrast, in-
dicating that the litigants' outcomes fell below expectations more
often under the settlement conference procedure than in bilateral
settlement. There is also a significant positive link. between subjec-
tive assessments of the outcome and satisfaction with it.4o In gen-
eral, the findings from this model favor relative-outcome, "social
exchange" explanations of outcome satisfaction.
IX. CONCLUSION
Keeping in mind that our findings may be limited to the tort
context, the findings described above nonetheless provide a rather
remarkable picture of how tort litigants evaluate the procedures
they encounter. Two findings are particularly striking. First, the
litigants' views of the two adjudicatory procedures, especially their
views of trials, are much more favorable than might have been ex-
pected from some common suppositions about the benefits of set-
tlement and settlement-oriented procedures. Second, it is notewor-
thy that there was no substantial relationship between procedural
fairness judgments and objective measures of outcome, cost, and
delay. The findings with respect to the adjudicatory procedures
show that some of the supposed problems of such procedures may
well be exaggerated, and the findings for the objective measures
show that litigant reactions depend, in the fiilal analysis, on sub-
jective constructions of procedures and outcomes.
A. Reactions to Adjudicatory Procedures
The litigants in Fairfax County viewed trials as dignified, care-
ful procedures and reported that they had little trouble under-
standing what was happening at the trial. For them trials offered a
substantial opportunity to participate in the legal process. Overall,
they viewed trials as fair procedures, fairer in fact than bilateral
settlement, and were as satisfied with trial outcomes as with bilat-
39 Chi-square (2)=.01, p>.90, GFI=.99, AGFI=.99; for the model exclud-
ing the direct link between the settlement conference-settlement contrast,
chi-square (3)=1.79, p>.61, GFI=.99, AGFI=.95.
40 The remaining direct link between the settlement conference-bilateral
settlement contrast and outcome satisfaction is not significant, but it is large
enough (standardized path coefficient = .13) to suggest that the variables in
the model might not explain all of the settlement conference effect on out-
come satisfaction.
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eral settlement outcomes. These findings stand in sharp contrast to
the conventional image of trial as an alienating, frustrating experi-
ence that leaves litigants feeling dissatisfied and unfairly treated.
Apparently, what has been overlooked in previous analyses of
the likely reactions of litigants to traditional trial procedures is the
considerable importance that litigants attach to being treated with
respect and dignity. It has been widely assumed in both policy-ori-
ented and academic discussions of trial procedures that the formal-
ity and ritual of trial disturb and confuse litigants. Given our find-
ings, it seems likely that these very features of trial enhance,
rather than diminish, the apparent fairness of the procedure. The
structural equations analyses revealed that the perception of pro-
cedural dignity was the crucial variable leading to higher proce-
dural fairness ratings for trials than for bilateral settlements.
But why should the perception that a procedure is dignified be
so important to litigants' procedural fairness judgments? Accord-
ing to the Lind and Tyler group-value theory of procedural justice
judgments (1988: chap. 10), the answer lies in the symbolic implica-
tions of a dignified process. Lind and Tyler suggest that dignified
procedures tend to provoke favorable responses because under
them litigants feel that the court accords importance to the per-
sons and subject matter involved in the dispute. Thus, for our tort
litigants, the fact the court was willing to undertake a dignified
hearing of the dispute may have constituted evidence that the civil
justice system took the litigants and the dispute seriously. The fact
that their case was deemed important enough to receive so respec-
tuful a hearing was probably quite flattering. After all, the trial
was in all likelihood one of the most meticulous, most individual-
ized interactions that the litigant had ever experienced in the
course of his or her contacts with government agencies.
In contrast, litigants whose cases settle prior to trial may feel
that their cases had not received the court's full attention and that
their disputes-and thus they themselves-had not been consid-
ered important enough to warrant trial. Bilateral settlements
might lack dignity in another way. Litigants may well view their
case not as a dispute about outcomes but as a clash between their
own view of reality and an opposing, apparently erroneous and
sometimes malicious view of reality (McEwen, 1988; Merry and
Silbey, 1984; Sarat and Felstiner, 1988). For such a dispute to be re-
solved through bilateral negotiations that focus only on money
may seem to the litigants to trivialize the issues of right and wrong
that are the focus of their concern.
Using procedure to express and create value is a theme that
runs through legal interpretations of the due process clause of the
U.S. Constitution and through commentary on how to structure
adjudicatory and administrative procedures. For example, under
current Supreme Court doctrine, the amount of process "due" var-
ies with the nature of the procedural interest at stake; the stronger
HeinOnline -- 24 Law & Soc’y Rev. 982 1990
982 LITIGANT EVALUATION OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
a disputant's interest, the greater the possibility that the state will
be required to provide more procedural protection (Mathews v. El-
dridge, 1976). Given this approach to the constitutional guarantees
of process, our findings suggest that both the judges who devel-
oped such doctrines and the litigants in our study share the view
that a procedure has the capacity both to express and to create un-
derstandings about the appropriate relations between citizen and
state (Resnik, 1984). The cultural embeddedness of the litigants in
our study is worth underscoring; their preferences are constructed
in the context of current decisionmaking methods and the worth
ascribed to them (Sunstein, 1986).
But if trials benefit from being seen as dignified, they also
pose fewer disadvantages than most commentators suppose. As we
note below, our data give little reason to think that litigants react
positively to procedures simply because they provide a less expen-
sive or faster means of resolving the dispute; hence, whatever cost
and delay trials entail are less important to litigants than is widely
assumed. Further, ADR advocates' assumptions about negative
consequences of the formality of the trial process are contradicted
by our findings that litigants view trials as more understandable
and as offering more participation than bilateral settlements. Our
findings suggest also that there is a need to reconsider how liti-
gants view settlement processes: it may be settlement, rather than
trial, that is seen as difficult to understand and that diminishes
feelings of participation.
In light of the large proportion of cases that settle and the cur-
rent enthusiasm for increasing settlement rates even further,
there is clearly need for more extensive investigations of litigant
reactions to bilateral settlement. Our findings and those of others
who have looked at litigant reactions to the bilateral settlement
process (Erlanger et aI., 1987) raise the possibility that reforms
that increase settlement rates may in fact diminish perceived jus-
tice. It is worth noting that much of the literature in praise of set-
tlement is about how lawyers and judges view settlement. Our
findings contribute to a growing literature that suggests that how-
ever popular settlement is among members of the legal commu-
nity, it may be received less enthusiastically by disputants.
Trial is not the only procedure that benefits from perceptions
of dignity. We found that tort litigants who experienced court-an-
nexed arbitration procedures view arbitration as fairer than bilat-
eral settlement, apparently because they view the arbitration hear-
ings as more dignified than settlement negotiations. These findings
give additional evidence of the role of dignity in perceptions of
procedural justice and show that it is possible for procedures less
formal than trial to have nonetheless sufficient dignity to lead to
high levels of perceived justice.
The data do not, however, paint an unambiguously favorable
picture of trial and arbitration. One hypothesized negative conse-
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quence of adjudication was borne out by our findings. The two ad-
judicatory procedures appeared to make litigants more sensitive to
winning or losing than did the two settlement-oriented procedures.
This vindication/condemnation effect supports the common suppo-
sition that adjudication leads to greater experience of blaming on
the part of losers than do more conciliatory procedures. The data
also point out that there is another side to the effect: Winners ap-
pear to feel better under adjudicatory procedures. We assessed the
magnitude and the net result of the vindication/condemnation ef-
feet for litigant evaluations of procedures. In the present context
at least, the effect on procedural fairness judgments was not as
strong as previous conceptual analyses might have led one to ex-
pect. The major impact of the vindication/condemnation effect was
on evaluations of the outcome, rather than on evaluations of the
procedure, and the effect was not sufficiently strong to overpower
the procedural fairness benefits of trial and court-annexed arbitra-
tion.
Of course, our findings with respect to procedural differences
in litigant reactions apply only to tort cases; quite different evalua-
tions may well occur in other legal contexts. As we noted above,
some earlier studies in small claims and criminal court settings
(Casper, 1978; McEwen and Maiman, 1984) have shown less
favorable reactions to adjudication and more favorable reactions to
settlement procedures. On the other hand, studies of tort and con-
tract litigation (Lind, 1990; MacCoun et al., 1988) have produced
findings that are quite consistent with those reported here, re-
vealing relatively favorable litigant reactions to adjudication. We
have no ready explanation for the apparent differences in the eval-
uation of adjudication and settlement procedures in different set-
tings: there is nothing in the theoretical literature to explain the
emerging pattern of findings. Clearly more research is needed to
discover how procedural evaluations vary with different legal con-
texts.
B. Subjectivity ofLitigant Evaluations ofProcedures and
Outcomes
The litigants' evaluations of the procedures showed little cor-
relation with the amount they received or with the cost or delay
they experienced in concluding the case, and their evaluations of
the case outcome showed only moderate correlations with the ob-
jective measures of outcome, cost, and delay. In fact, objective
measures of outcomes, cost, and case duration together accounted
for only 3-8 percent of the variation in procedural justice judg-
ments and for only 10-24 percent of the variation in outcome satis-
faction. In contrast, subjective evaluations of the outcome, cost,
and delay and subjective perceptions of the litigation process to-
gether accounted for 54-59 percent of the variation in procedural
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justice judgments and 57-82 percent of the variation in outcome
satisfaction. The caveats we noted above with respect to the tort
context of the study must be considered in judging the implica-
tions of these findings, but we have addressed above, and to some
extent discounted, the possibility that this finding was due to the
fee and outcome arrangements that characterize tort litigation.
In retrospect it may seem less than surprising that procedural
justice judgments and outcome satisfaction are so subjective. After
all, perceptions of procedural justice and outcome satisfaction are
themselves essentially attitudinal responses, and it seems natural
that they would be more closely linked to other attitudes than to
objective measures of outcome, cost, or delay. There are two rea-
sons that we nevertheless regard our findings as noteworthy. First,
although in hindsight it seems reasonable that procedural justice
judgments are not linked as closely to objective measures as to
other attitudinal measures, it is striking that perceptions of proce-
dural fairness are so thoroughly subjective, so completely unre-
lated to objective features of the litigation. Second, however rea-
sonable the findings seem in retrospect, many policy and academic
debates do assume that fairness judgments and satisfaction are
closely tied to objective outcomes, cost, and delay.
To the extent that procedural justice judgments and outcome
satisfaction showed links to the outcome or cost of the litigation,
the crucial factor was the litigants' subjective assessment of
whether the outcome or cost was more or less than expected.
These subjective assessments of outcome or cost were not much re-
lated to the objective outcome or cost of the case, suggesting that
most of the variation in the subjective measures of outcome and
cost is attributable to differences in expectations or in standards,
rather than differences in actual outcomes or costs. This, in turn,
suggests that satisfaction and perceived fairness depend more on
whether a litigant has modest expectations than on whether he or
she actually receives favorable outcomes or low costs. The experi-
ence of justice system events such as costs or outcomes is more
subjective--and more detached from objective features of the ex-
perience--than might have been expected prior to this study.
The subjective nature of procedural justice judgments and out-
come satisfaction poses problems for those who attempt to improve
litigant reactions by altering the economics or duration of litiga-
tion. As we noted above, those who argue for procedural innova-
tions often assert that the reduced cost and delay they hope to
achieve will produce greater litigant satisfaction and greater feel-
ings of fairness. Our findings show that reduced cost and delay,
however desirable in their own right, cannot be counted on to in-
crease litigant satisfaction and to enhance feelings of procedural
justice. Indeed, if the innovation in question somehow interferes
with the enactment of a sufficiently dignified procedure, our find-
ings suggest it will lead to dissatisfaction and perceived unfairness.
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Our findings point out the need for more research on how liti-
gants' arrive at expectations about the likely outcome and cost of
litigation. We suspect that expectations about outcome and cost are
often affected by conversations with counsel, especially conversa-
tions occurring in the very early stages of litigation. There may
well be other sources of outcome and cost expectations. Norms and
attributions about responsibility for the incident that led to the lit-
igation, early offers of partial payment by one's opponent (Vidmar,
1986), conventional wisdom about the expense of litigating a claim,
or the comments and experiences of friends and relatives-all
might affect how much litigants expect to pay and how much they
expect to receive. Future studies would do well to start collecting
data very early in the claiming process and to trace the origins and
development of litigants' expectations.
Our study shows that litigants assess procedures in terms of
how well the procedures meet their own personal standards of
procedural fairness. It is clear that objective differences in proce-
dures do affect litigants' judgments of whether their standards are
met: The trial and arbitration effects we observed demonstrate
that some procedures meet a standard of procedural dignity while
others do not. But we need more information on how specific as-
pects of the litigation process affect the perceptions that drive
judgments of procedural fairness (see Tyler, 1988)-more informa-
tion on how objective differences in the litigation process affect
subjective constructions of the process.
In addition, if we are to understand the evaluations, reactions,
and decisions of litigants, we must develop a more complete pic-
ture of the procedural standards and expectations that litigants
bring to the system. Our findings support theorists who emphasize
the pivotal role of the construction of preferences (Sunstein, 1986)
and point out the need to discover where personal procedural fair-
ness standards come from and how some procedural characteristics
come to affect procedural justice judgments while others do not.
Theoretical analyses of the psychology of procedural justice sug-
gest some basic procedural concerns, but there may well be other,
as yet unknown, factors that affect whether a given procedure en-
hances or diminishes perceived procedural justice. We need to look
at the procedural concerns and beliefs that litigants have prior to
their experience with the justice system, and we need to examine
how litigants' experiences with the law change, or do not change,
their concerns, beliefs, and standards of fairness. Investigation of
these issues has already begun (see, e.g., Merry and Silbey, 1984;
O'Barr and Conley, 1988; Sarat and Felstiner, 1988; Vidmar, 1984),
but more research must be done before we can understand what
precisely it is that makes experiences with the civil justice system
seem fair to those whom the system seeks to serve.
We must note one of the more troubling implications of our
findings. Our results show that procedural justice judgments are
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heavily influenced by subjective assessments of the procedure and
that outcome satisfaction depends more on expected than on objec-
tive outcomes. These findings raise the issue of false consciousness:
the possibility that litigants might secure less than they deserve
and be made, through manipulation of their impressions and their
expectations, to like objectively unfair procedures and outcomes
(Cohen; 1985, 1988). The data reported here suggest that, however
regrettable, false consciousness of procedural justice might some-
times occur. Perceived justice and outcome satisfaction appear to
be determined largely by subjective expectations and impressions
rather than by objective features of litigation, and there is room
for people to be misled.
But there are also instances, as demonstrated by these liti-
gants' concern with procedural dignity, in which the factors that
drive disputants' fairness judgments and those that figure in judi-
cial and scholarly analyses of the meaning of procedural justice
converge. We cannot assume that such convergence will always ex-
ist, however, and we should continue to examine disputants' con-
structions of procedural justice to discover the ways in which ordi-
nary citizens' ideas of what constitutes justice are similar to
scholarly and judicial notions of justice and the ways in which they
are different.
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APPENDIX
SITES, SAMPLES, AND RESEARCH METHODS
A discussion of our criteria for selecting courts and litigants
for the study can be found in Lind et al (1989). Table A1 shows the
breakdown of completion rates as we moved from our initial sam-
ple of potential eligible respondents to our final analytic sample.
Table AI. Survey Completion Rates
Total Bucks Fairfax Prince Georges
Sample County County County
Eligible telephone sample 1,259 437 409 413
Not locatable 410 115 143 152
Net telephone sample 849 322 266 261
Refused 255 105 81 69
Percentage of net telephone
sample 30% 33% 30% 26%
Not reached during field period 188 87 36 65
Completed telephone interviews 406 130 149 127
Percentage of net telephone
sample interviewed litigants
excluded from final sample: 48% 40% 56% 49%
Property damage only 58 41 14 3
Case value reported to be
greater than $35,000 15 2 4 9
Unable to identify procedure 47 13 9 25
Final analytic sample 286 74 122 90
A. Characteristics of the Final Analytic Sample
The average age of litigants in the final analytic sample was
40. The sample included 166 (58 percent) men and 120 (42 percent)
women. Eighty-five percent of the sample were employed full or
part time outside the home. Sixty-five percent were married. The
sample was 88 percent Caucasian, 9 percent Black, and 3 percent
other ethnic groups. Eight percent of the sample had not com-
pleted high school, 27 percent had a high-school diploma, 31 per-
cent had some college, and the remaining 33 percent had a college
degree. Five percent of the sample reported a total family income
of $10,000 or less, 16 percent reported income between $10,000 and
20,000, 19 percent reported income between $25,000 and $35,000, 28
percent reported income between $35,000 and $50,000, and 32 per-
cent reported income over $50,000.
The final analytic sample consisted of 145 plaintiffs and 141
defendants. Ninety-eight percent of the plaintiffs and 100 percent
of the defendants were represented by counsel. Ninety percent of
the defendants were insured, and most (86 percent of all defend-
ants) were represented by lawyers supplied by their insurance
company. Nearly all (94 percent) of the plaintiffs reported ihat
their lawyers were working on a contingent fee arrangement. The
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most frequent contingent fee rate was one-third of the award: 70
percent of the contingent fee plaintiffs reported this rate. The
range of reported contingent fee rates was 10 to 60 percent of the
award; about 8 percent of the contingent fee plaintiffs reported
rates less than one-third of the award, and about 22 percent re-
ported rates greater than one-third of the award.
Most (78 percent) of the cases in which the respondents had
been involved were automobile-related personal injury torts; the
remainder were other personal injury torts. Most respondents had
no relationship with their opponent prior to the incident that initi-
ated the case: Only 16 percent reported any business or personal
relationship prior to the case.
Some litigants had more at stake than did others. Plaintiffs,
for example, had more at stake in terms of outcomes and costs
than did defendants: The net outcome received by the plaintiffs
ranged from $0 to $35,000 with a mean of $7,622, and the litigation
costs and legal fees paid by the plaintiffs ranged from $0 to $18,006
with a mean of $3,767; in contrast, while the defendants' out-of-
pocket payments for settlement and judgments ranged from $0 to
$19,000, their mean out-of-pocket payment was only $1,536. De-
fendants' out-of-pocket payment for legal costs ranged from $0 to
$5,000, but their mean out-of-pocket cost was only $221. It should
be noted that about 14 percent of the defendants paid directly
some or all of the case outcome; the amount these defendants paid
ranged from $0 to $19,000 with a mean of $6,647. Similarly, approx-
imately 14 percent of defendants paid at least part of their own
legal costs; their legal costs ranged from $0 to $5,000 with a mean
of $1,591.
B. Questions Used in the Interviews
A copy of the entire interview protocol can be obtained from
the authors. The following questions were used to collect data on
the subjective variables discussed in this article. (Mean values are
scaled so that higher values represent ratings in the direction of
the variable name. The tables that follow include all responses;




[Arbitration] "At the time you went through it, how fair did you
think the arbitration hearing procedure was?"
[Judicial settlement conference] "At the time the conference took
place, how fair did you think it was?"
[Trial] "At the time you went through it, how fair did you think
the trial was?"
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[Settlement] "At the time, how fair did you think the settlement
process was?"
[For all versions] Response options: "Very fair," "Somewhat fair,"
"Somewhat unfair," "Very unfair." (Scale values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 2.68 2.11 3.14 2.51 2.46 2.79
S.D. 1.13 1.06 0.89 1.03 1.05 0.83
N 97 24 51 22 52 35
Question 2. Finally, looking back, do you think the procedure that
was used for resolving your dispute was:"
Response options: "Very fair," "Somewhat fair," "Somewhat un-
fair," "Very unfair." (Scale values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 2.70 2.42 2.87 2.62 2.76 3.08
S.D. 1.13 0.97 1.04 1.06 0.99 0.63
N 97 24 51 22 52 35
OUTCOME SATISFACTION. "How did you feel about the final
outcome-were you:
Response options: "Very satisfied," "Somewhat satisfied," "Some-
what dissatisfied," "Very dissatisified." (Scale values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 2.24 2.26 2.30 2.18 2.25 2.63
S.D. 1.26 1.21 1.25 1.00 1.21 0.94
N 97 23 47 22 51 35
EVALUATION OF CASE OUTCOME. "Compared to what you
expected when the case was first filed, was the final outcome:"
Response options: "Better than you expected," "worse than you
expected," "Just about what you expected." (Scale values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 2.01 2.04 1.94 2.07 2.10 2.45
S.D. 1.21 1.15 1.06 0.97 1.19 1.15
N 94 23 48 21 52 33
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EVALUATION OF CASE DURATION. "Considering what had to
be done, do you think the time it took for your case to get re-
solved was:
Response options: "Very reasonable," Somewhat reasonable,"
"Somewhat unreasonable," "Very unreasonable." (Scale values
= 1-5)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 3.37 2.91 3.39 3.23 3.75 2.69
S.D. 1.47 1.48 1.50 1.60 1.45 1.47
N 98 22 51 22 53 35
"Did it take too much time to resolve the case or was there not
enough time?" [Asked if response to above was not "Very rea-
sonable"]
Response options: "Too much time," "Not enough time."
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Percent too
much time 87% 65% 91% 72% 88% 64%
N 85 20 44 18 48 28
EVALUATION OF LITIGATION COST. "All things considered,
do you think you got your money's worth from your attorney or
not?"
Response options: "Yes," "No."
Fairfax Bucks
Settle- Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment
Percent yes 64% 56% 41% 50%







Outcome Control. "How much control did you feel you had over
the outcome of your case?"
Response options: "A great deal," "Some," "A little," "Not much."
(Scale values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 1.86 1.80 1.69 1.90 1.86 2.04
S.D. 1.09 1.06 0.96 1.31 1.12 1.23
N 97 24 52 22 52 37
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Process Control. "Overall, thinking about your dealings with the
court and with your lawyer, how much control would you say
you had over the way your case was handled?"




Trial ment Arbitration ment
Mean 2.33 2.13 2.01 2.18
S.D. 1.10 1.12 1.06 1.18








Question 1. "People have different opinions and experiences with
lawyers. Thinking about your lawyer and the way he/she han-
dled the case, do you think his/her knowledge of the facts in
your case was:"
Response options: "More than adequate," "Adequate," "Not ade-
quate." (Scale values = 1-5)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 3.70 3.42 3.57 3.56 3.54 3.75
S.D. 1.48 1.26 1.44 1.50 1.38 1.08
N 96 19 46 18 52 32
Question 2. "How much could you trust him/her to make deci-
sions that were in your best interest-"
Response options: "A lot," "Some," "Not much." (Scale values =
1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 3.36 2.90 3.28 3.12 3.43 3.32
S.D. 1.09 1.26 1.09 1.32 1.00 0.98
N 96 21 44 17 51 28
PARTICIPATED IN PROCESS. "Thinking back over the whole
experience, how much would you say you participated in the
process of disposing of your case?"
Response options: "A lot," "Some," "A little," "Not much." (Scale
values = 1-4)
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Fairfax Bucks
Settle- Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment
Mean 2.86 2.08 2.40 2.14
S.D. 1.08 1.14 1.14 1.17







PROCEDURE DIGNIFIED. "Which word best describes your
(hearing/settlement conference/trial/experience [settlement])?"
Response options: "Dignified," "Undignified."
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Percent
dignified 89% 57% 86% 67% 73% 81%
S.D.
N 89 23 42 21 45 36
COMFORTABLE WITH PROCEDURE. "Which word best de-
scribes your (hearing/settlement conference/trial/experience
[settlement]?"
Response options: "Comfortable," "Uncomfortable."
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Percent
comfortable 49% 44% 57% 55% 48% 66%
N 89 23 42 22 48 35
UNDERSTOOD PROCEDURE. "While your case was proceeding,
how well did you feel you understood what was going on?"
Response options: "A lot," "Some," "A little," "Not at all." (Scale
values = 1-4)
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Mean 3.70 3.25 3.45 3.23 3.22 3.09
S.D. 0.63 0.94 0.76 1.11 0.90 1.17
N 97 24 51 22 51 35
PROCEDURE CAREFUL
Question 1. "Which word best describes your (hearing/settlement
conference/trial/experience [settlement])?"
Response options: "Careful," "Casual."
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Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Percent
careful 77% 44% 45% 41% 52% 71%
N 88 23 42 22 48 35
Question 2. [Same question as above, but different response op-
tions.]
Response options: "Superficial," "Thorough."
Fairfax Bucks Prince Georges
Settle- Settle- Settlement Settle-
Trial ment Arbitration ment Conference ment
Percent
superficial 87% 65% 91% 72% 88% 64%
N 88 23 42 22 48 35
